Verification of cryptographic protocols: tagging enforces termination  by Blanchet, Bruno & Podelski, Andreas
Theoretical Computer Science 333 (2005) 67–90
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols:
tagging enforces termination
Bruno Blancheta,b,∗, Andreas Podelskib
aCNRS, Département d’Informatique, École Normale Supérieure, Paris
bMax-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken D-66123, Germany
Abstract
We investigate a resolution-based veriﬁcation method for secrecy and authentication properties
of cryptographic protocols. In experiments, we could enforce its termination by tagging, a syntactic
transformation ofmessages that leaves attack-free executions invariant. In this paper, we generalize the
experimental evidence: we prove that the veriﬁcation method always terminates for tagged protocols.
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1. Introduction
The veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols is an active research area, see [1–37]. It is
important since the design of protocols is error-prone, and testing cannot reveal potential
attacks against the protocols. In this paper, we study a veriﬁcation technique based on
Horn clauses and resolution akin to [4,5,34]. We consider a protocol that is executed in the
presence of an attacker that can listen to the network, compute, and send messages. The
protocol and the attacker are translated into a set of Horn clauses such that: if the fact att(M)
is not derivable from the clauses, then the protocol preserves the secrecy of the messageM
in every possible execution. The correctness veriﬁed is stronger than the one required since
the executions possible in the Horn clause model include the ones where a send or receive
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instruction can be applied more than once in the same session. In practice, the difference
between the correctness criteria does not show (no false alarm arose in our experiments).
The veriﬁcation technique consists of the translation into Horn clauses, followed by the
checking of the derivability of facts att(M) by a resolution-based algorithm. It has the
following characteristics.
• It can verify protocols with an unbounded number of sessions.
• It can easily handle a variety of cryptographic primitives, including shared- and public-
key cryptography (encryption and signatures), hash functions, message authentication
codes (mac), and even a simple model of Difﬁe–Hellman key agreements. It can also be
used to verify authentication [5].
• It is efﬁcient in practice (many examples of protocols of the literature are veriﬁed in less
than 0.1 s on a 1GHz PC; see [5]).
The resolution-based veriﬁcation algorithm has one drawback: it does not terminate in
general. In fact, in our experiments, the algorithm did not terminate (went into an inﬁnite
loop) when we applied it to the Needham–Schroeder shared-key protocol [4] and several
versions of the Woo–Lam shared-key one-way authentication protocol [5]. It is always
possible to modify the algorithm to make it work on those cases and any ﬁnite number
of other cases, but that will not affect its inherent non-termination property (inherent by
the undecidability of the problem that it tries to solve). In this paper, we investigate an
alternative: tagging the protocol.
Tagging consists in adding a unique constant to eachmessage.This is a syntactic operation
done once on the textual representation of the protocol; i.e., no new tags are generated during
the execution of the protocol, in contrast to nonces. For instance, to encrypt the message m
under the key k, we add the tag c0 tom, so that the encryption becomes sencrypt((c0,m), k).
The tagged protocol retains the intended behaviour of the original protocol; i.e., the attack-
free executions are the same. Under attacks, it is possibly more secure. Therefore, tagging
is a feature of a good protocol design, as explained, e.g. in [2]: the receiver of a message
uses the tag to identify it unambiguously; thus tagging prevents type ﬂaws that occur when a
message is taken for another message. (This is formally proved in [21] for a tagging scheme
very similar to ours.) This also means that a security proof for a tagged protocol does not
imply security of an untagged version. Tagging is also motivated by practical issues: the
decoding of incoming messages becomes easier. For all these reasons, tags are already
present in protocols such as SSH.
In our experiments (including the protocols mentioned above), we obtained termina-
tion after tagging the protocol. In this paper, we give the theory behind the experiments:
the resolution-based veriﬁcation algorithm always terminates on tagged protocols. More
precisely, the algorithm terminates on protocols where tags are added to each use of a cryp-
tographic primitive, which may be among: public-key cryptography where keys are atomic,
shared-key cryptography (unrestricted), hash functions, and message authentication codes
(mac’s).
This means that we show termination for a class of protocols that includes many relevant
examples.
Overview: To verify a protocol, we translate it into a set of Horn clauses. In Section 2,
we give an example of such a translation and deﬁne the formal protocol models that form
the input of the algorithm. We then, in Section 3, deﬁne the algorithm to check secrecy
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properties of a protocol. Sections 2 and 3 provide the background for the results in this
paper; they recapitulate and extend material from [4]. In Section 4, we give a number of
formal properties of sets ofHorn clauses.The properties do not only express that the protocol
is tagged, but also that the set of Horn clauses arises as a model of a ‘reasonable’protocol. In
Section 5, we prove that the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate for tagged protocols, i.e.
for Horn clausemodels that satisfy the properties deﬁned in Section 4. In Section 6, we show
that the algorithm is exponential in the worst case for tagged protocols. The algorithm can
be extended to authentication; in Section 7, we answer the question whether the termination
result still holds for the extension of the algorithm to authentication. We relate our work to
existing work in Section 8.
2. The Horn clause model of a protocol
Cryptographic protocols can be translated into Horn clauses, either by hand, as explained
in [4,34], or automatically, for instance, from a representation of the protocol in an extension
of the pi calculus, as in [1].
The terms in the Horn clauses stand for messages. The translation uses one predicate att.
The fact att(M) means that the attacker may have the term M. The fundamental property
of this representation is that if att(M) is not derivable from the clauses, then the protocol
preserves the secrecy of M.
The clauses are of two kinds: the clauses inRPrimitives that depend only on the signature
of the cryptographic primitives (they represent computation abilities of the attacker) and
the clauses inRProt that one extracts from the protocol itself.
2.1. Attacker clauses (“RPrimitives”)
The protocols use cryptographic primitives of two kinds: constructors and destructors
(see Fig. 1). A constructor f is used to build up a new term f (M1, . . . ,Mn). For example,
the term sencrypt(M,N) is the encoding of the term M with the key N (by shared-key
encryption). A destructor g applied to terms M1, . . . ,Mn yields a term M built up from
subterms ofM1, . . . ,Mn. It is deﬁned by a ﬁnite set def(g) of equations written as reduction
rules g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M where the termsM1, . . . ,Mn,M contain only constructors and
variables. For example, the rule sdecrypt(sencrypt(M,N),N) → M models the decoding
of the term sencrypt(M,N) with the same key used for the encoding.
The attacker can form new messages by applying constructors and destructors to already
obtained messages. This is modeled, for instance, by the following clauses for shared-key
encryption.
att(x) ∧ att(y) → att(sencrypt(x, y)) (sencrypt)
att(sencrypt(x, y)) ∧ att(y) → att(x) (sdecrypt)
The ﬁrst clause expresses that if the attacker has the message x and the shared key y, then
he can form the message sencrypt(x, y). The second clause means that if the attacker has
the message sencrypt(x, y) and the key y, then he can obtain the message x (by applying
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Tuples:
Constructor: tuple (M1, . . . ,Mn)
Destructors: projections ithn((M1, . . . ,Mn)) → Mi
Shared-key encryption:
Constructor: encryption of M under the key N, sencrypt(M,N)
Destructor: decryption sdecrypt(sencrypt(M,N),N) → M
Public-key encryption:
Constructors: encryption of M under the public key N, pencrypt(M,N)
public key generation from a secret key N, pk(N)
Destructor: decryption pdecrypt(pencrypt(M, pk(N)),N) → M
Signatures:
Constructor: signature of M with the secret key N, sign(M,N)
Destructors: signature checking checksignature(sign(M,N), pk(N)) → M
message without signature getmessage(sign(M,N)) → M
Non-message-revealing signatures:
Constructors: signature of M with the secret key N, nmrsign(M,N)
constant true
Destructor: signature checking nmrchecksign(nmrsign(M,N), pk(N),M)→ true
One-way hash functions:
Constructor: hash function hash(M).
Message authentication codes, keyed hash functions:
Constructor: mac of M with key N, mac(M,N)
Fig. 1. Constructors and destructors.
the destructor sdecrypt and then using the equality between sdecrypt(sencrypt(x, y), y)
and x according to the reduction rule for sdecrypt).
We furthermore distinguish between data and cryptographic constructors and destructors
and thus, in total, between four kinds of primitives. The setDataConstr of data constructors
contains those f that come with a destructor gi deﬁned by gi(f (x1, . . . , xn)) → xi for each
i = 1, . . . , n; i.e. gi is used for selecting the argument of f in the i-th position. It is generally
sufﬁcient to have only tuples as data constructors (with projections as destructors).All other
constructors are said to be cryptographic constructors; they form the set CryptoConstr. We
collect all clauses like the two example clauses above, for each of the four cases, in the set
RPrimitives of clauses or rules deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 1 (Program for primitives,RPrimitives). The program for primitives,RPrimitives,
is the union of the four sets of Horn clauses corresponding to each of the four cases of
cryptographic primitives:
• RCryptoConstr is the set of clauses att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xn) → att(f (x1, . . . , xn)) where f
is a cryptographic constructor.
• RDataConstr is the set of clauses att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xn) → att(f (x1, . . . , xn)) where f is
a data constructor.
• RCryptoDestr is the set of clauses att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) → att(M) where there exists
a cryptographic destructor g with the reduction rule g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M .
• RDataDestr is the set of clauses att(f (x1, . . . , xn)) → att(xi)where f is a data constructor
and i = 1, . . . , n.
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These clauses are similar to inference rules that are used to compute the knowledge of
the attacker in symbolic protocol veriﬁcation systems such as [6,25,33]. Our veriﬁcation
method differs from these systems by the model of protocol actions explained below.
2.2. Protocol clauses (“RProt”)
We noteRProt the set of protocol clauses. These include clauses that directly correspond
to send and receive instructions of the protocol and clauses translating the initial knowledge
of the attacker. (The clauses in RProt can be compared to penetrator strands in the strand
spaces model [17] and to rules S → m in the setup with rank functions [22].)
In a protocol clause of the form
att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) → att(M)
the term M in the conclusion represents the sent message. The hypotheses correspond to
messages received by the same host before sendingM. Indeed, the clause means that if the
attacker hasM1, . . . ,Mn, he can send these messages to a participant who is then going to
reply with M, and the attacker can then intercept this message.
If the initial knowledge of the attacker consists of the set of terms SInit (containing, e.g.
public keys, host names, and a name N that represents all names that the attacker creates),
then it is represented by the facts att(M) where M is a term in SInit.
We explain protocol clauses on the example of theYahalom protocol [9]
Message 1. A → B : (A,Na)
Message 2. B → S : (B, {A,Na,Nb}Kbs )
Message 3. S → A : ({B,Kab,Na,Nb}Kas , {A,Kab}Kbs ),
Message 4. A → B : ({A,Kab}Kbs {Nb}Kab)
In this protocol, two participants A and B wish to establish a session keyKab, with the help
of a trusted server S. Initially, A has a shared key Kas to communicate with S, and B has a
shared keyKbs to communicate with S. In the ﬁrst message, A sends to B his name A and a
nonce (fresh value) Na . Then B creates a nonce Nb and sends to the server his own name B
and the encryption {A,Na,Nb}Kbs ofA,Na,Nb under the shared keyKbs . The server then
creates the new (fresh) session key Kab, and sends two encrypted messages to A. The ﬁrst
one {B,Kab,Na,Nb}Kas gives the key Kab to A, together with B’s name and the nonces
(so that A knows that the key is intended to communicate with B). The second message
cannot be decrypted by A, so A forwards it to B (message 4). B then obtains the session key
Kab. The second part of message 4, {Nb}Kab , is used to check that A and B really use the
same keyKab: B is going to check that he can decrypt the message with the newly received
key. We encode only one principal playing each role, since others can be included in the
attacker. (This excludes the case in which one principal runs the protocol with itself; we
mention one way of handling this case at the beginning of Section 5.)
Message 1 is represented by the clause
att((host(Kas),Na)) (Msg1)
meaning that the attacker gets host(Kas) and Na when intercepting message 1. In this
clause, the host name A is represented by host(Kas). Indeed, the server has a table of pairs
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(host name, shared key to communicate between that host and the server), and this table can
be conveniently represented by a constructor host. This constructor takes as parameter the
secret key and returns the host name. So host names are written host(k). The server can also
match a term host(k) to ﬁnd back the secret key. The attacker cannot do this operation (he
does not have the key table), so there is no destructor clause for host. There is a constructor
clause, since the attacker can build new hosts with new host keys:
att(k) → att(host(k)) (host)
This encoding of host names and keys works well when one key is associated with each
host. One could adapt the model to other situations, for instance when a key is initially
shared between each pair of users.
Message 2 is represented by the clause:
att((a, na)) → att((host(Kbs), sencrypt((a, na,Nb(a, na)),Kbs))) (Msg2)
The hypothesismeans that amessage (a, na) (corresponding tomessage 1)must be received
before sendingmessage 2. It corresponds to the situation in which the attacker sends (a, na)
to B, B takes that for message 1, and replies with message 2, which is intercepted by the
attacker. (a and na are variables since B accepts any term instead of host(Kas) and Na.)
The nonce Nb is represented by the function Nb(a, na). Indeed, since a new name is
created at each execution, names created after receiving different messages are different.
This is modeled by considering names as functions of the messages previously received.
The creation of a fresh name corresponds to an existential quantiﬁcation in the linear logic
model of [16]; our modeling of names by functions corresponds to a skolemization of these
existential quantiﬁers. This modeling is slightly weaker than creating a new name at each
run of the protocol, but it is correct: if a secrecy property is proved in this model, then it
is true [1]. The introduced function symbols will be called “name function symbols”. (In
message 1, the fresh name Na is a constant because there are no previous messages on
which it would depend.)
Message 3 is represented by the clause:
att((host(kbs), sencrypt((host(kas), na, nb), kbs)))
→ att((sencrypt((host(kbs),Kab(kas, kbs, na, nb), na, nb), kas),
sencrypt((host(kas),Kab(kas, kbs, na, nb)), kbs)))
(Msg3)
using the same principles. Finally, message 4 is represented by
att((sencrypt((b, k,Na, nb),Kas),mb)) → att((mb, sencrypt(nb, k))) (Msg4)
The message sencrypt((host(Kas), k),Kbs) cannot be decrypted and checked by A, so it
is a variable mb.
The goal of the protocol is to establish a secret shared keyKab betweenA andB. If the key
was a constant, say Kab, then the non-derivability of the fact att(Kab) from the Horn clauses
presented so far would prove its secrecy. However, Kab, as received by A, is a variable k.
We therefore use the following fact. The key Kab received by A is secret if and only if
some constant secretA remains secret when A sends it encrypted under the key Kab. Thus,
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we add a clause that corresponds to the translation of an extra message of the protocol,
Message 5. A → B : {secretA}Kab .
att((sencrypt((host(Kbs), k,Na, nb),Kas),mb))
→ att(sencrypt(secretA, k)) (Msg5)
Now, the secrecy of the key Kab received by A can be proved from the non-derivability of
the fact att(secretA) from the set of clausesRPrimitives ∪RProt.
For the Yahalom protocol, the translation yields the union of the following sets of Horn
clauses. RCryptoConstr contains (sencrypt) and (host), RCryptoDestr contains (sdecrypt),
RDataConstr contains the tuple construction and RDataDestr the tuple projections (both not
listed), andRProt contains (Msg1), (Msg2), (Msg3), (Msg4) and (Msg5) and three clauses
translating the initial knowledge, att(N), att(host(Kas)), and att(host(Kbs)).
3. The resolution-based veriﬁcation algorithm
To determine whether a fact is derivable from the clauses, we use a resolution-based
algorithm explained below. (We use the meta-variables R,H,C, F for rule, hypothesis,
conclusion, fact, respectively.)
The algorithm infers new clauses by resolution as follows: From two clauses R = H →
C and R′ = F ∧ H ′ → C′ (where F is any hypothesis of R′), it infers R ◦F R′ =
H ∧ H ′ → C′, where C and F are uniﬁable and  is the most general uniﬁer of C and
F . The clause R ◦F R′ is the combination of R and R′, where R proves the hypothesis F of
R′. The resolution is guided by a selection function sel. Namely, sel(R) returns a subset of
the hypotheses of R, and the resolution step above is performed only when sel(R) = ∅ and
F ∈ sel(R′).
We can use several selection functions. In this paper, we use:
sel(H → C) =
{ ∅ if all elements of H are of the form att(x), x variable
{F } where F = att(x) and F ∈ H, otherwise
The algorithm uses the following optimizations:
• Decomposition of data constructors: decomp takes a clause and returns a set of clauses,
built as follows. For eachdata constructor f,decomp replaces recursively all factsatt(f (M1,
. . . ,Mn))with att(M1)∧· · ·∧att(Mn).When such a fact is in the conclusion of a clause, n
clauses are created, with the same hypotheses and the conclusions att(M1), . . . , att(Mn)
respectively. With decomposition, the standard clauses for data constructors and pro-
jections can be removed. The soundness of this operation follows from the equivalence
between att(f (M1, . . . ,Mn)) and att(M1)∧ · · ·∧att(Mn) in the presence of the clauses
att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xn) → att(f (x1, . . . , xn)) and att(f (x1, . . . , xn)) → att(xi) in
RDataConstr andRDataDestr.
• Elimination of duplicate hypotheses: elimdup takes a clause and returns the same clause
after keeping only one copy of duplicate hypotheses.
• Elimination of hypotheses att(x): elimattx eliminates hypotheses att(x) when x does
not appear elsewhere in the clause. Indeed, these hypotheses are always true, since the
attacker has at least one term.
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• Elimination of tautologies: elimtaut eliminates all tautologies (that is, clauses whose
conclusion is already in the hypotheses) from a set of clauses.
• simplify groups all these simpliﬁcations.We extend elimdup and elimattx naturally to sets
of clauses, and deﬁne simplify = elimtaut◦elimattx◦elimdup◦decomp. In this deﬁnition,
the simpliﬁcations are ordered in such a way that simplify ◦ simplify = simplify, so it is
not necessary to repeat the simpliﬁcation.
• condense(R), for a set of clauses R, applies simplify to each clause in R and then
eliminates subsumed clauses. We say that H1 → C1 subsumes H2 → C2 if and only if
there exists a substitution  such that C1 = C2 and H1 ⊆ H2. IfR contains clauses R
and R′, such that R subsumes R′, R′ is eliminated. (In that case, R can do all derivations
that R′ can do.)
We now deﬁne the algorithm saturate(R0). Starting from condense(R0), the algorithm
adds clauses inferred by resolution with the selection function sel and condenses the set
of clauses at each iteration step until a ﬁxpoint is reached. When a ﬁxpoint is reached,
saturate(R0) consists of the clauses R in the ﬁxpoint such that sel(R) = ∅. By adapting the
proof of [4] to this algorithm, it is easy to show that, for any R0 coming from a protocol
and any closed fact F, F is derivable fromRAll = R0 ∪RDataConstr ∪RDataDestr if and only
if it is derivable from saturate(R0) ∪RDataConstr.
Once the clauses of saturate(R0) have been computed, we use a standard backward
depth-ﬁrst search to see if a fact can be derived from saturate(R0) ∪ RDataConstr. Taking
R0 = RCryptoConstr∪RCryptoDestr∪RProt, if att(M) cannot be derived from saturate(R0)∪
RDataConstr then the protocol preserves the secrecy of M.
The optimizations enable us to weaken the conditions that guarantee termination. For
instance, the decomposition of data constructors makes it possible to obtain termination
without tagging each data constructor application, while other constructors such as en-
cryption must be tagged. In the Yahalom protocol, for example, without decomposition of
data constructors, the algorithm would resolve the clause (Msg2) with itself, immediately
yielding an inﬁnite loop.
Another consequence of the optimizations is that not all terms in a clause can be variables.
Indeed, when x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, the clause att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xn) → att(x) is eliminated
since it is a tautology. When x /∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, all hypotheses are eliminated, so the clause
becomes att(x) and all other clauses are eliminated since they are subsumed by att(x),
so the algorithm stops immediately: all facts can be derived. Thus, when sel(R) = ∅, the
conclusion of R is not of the form att(x). Therefore, the above selection function prevents
resolution steps in which att(x) is uniﬁed with another fact (actually, with any other fact,
which can lead to non-termination).
4. Sufﬁcient conditions for termination
We are now collecting the formal properties of sets of Horn clauses (logic programs, or
programs for short) that together entail termination. The properties for protocol programs
hold for the translation of every protocol. The properties for plain protocol programs hold
for the translation of protocols with a restriction on their cryptographic primitives and on
their keys (this restriction is satisﬁed by many interesting protocols, includingYahalom for
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example). The properties for tagged protocol programs hold for the translation of those
protocols after they have been tagged. The derivability problem for plain protocol programs
is undecidable (as can be easily seen by a reduction to two-countermachines).The restriction
to tagged programs makes the problem decidable, as will follow.
Given a clause R of the form att(M1)∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) → att(M0), we say that the terms
M0,M1, . . . ,Mn are the terms of R, and we denote the set of terms of R by terms(R).
Deﬁnition 2 (Protocol program). A protocol program is a set of clausesRAll = RPrimitives
∪RProt (whereRPrimitives is a program for primitives) that comes with a ﬁnite set of closed
terms S0 such that:
C1. For all clauses R inRProt, there exists a substitution  such that terms(R) ⊆ S0.
C2. Every two subterms of terms in S0 of the form a(. . .) with the same name function
symbol a are identical.
C3. The second argument of pencrypt in S0 is of the form pk(M) for some M.
The terminology “argument of f in S0” refers to a term M such that f (. . . ,M, . . .) is
a subterm of a term in S0. To see why these conditions are satisﬁed by a translation of a
protocol, let us consider the intended messages of the protocol. These are the exchanged
messages when the attacker does not intervene and when there is no unexpected interaction
between sessions of the protocol.We denote byM1, . . . ,Mk the closed terms corresponding
to these messages. Each participant does not necessarily have a full view of the messages
he receives; instead, he accepts all messages that are instances of patterns representing the
information he can check. The termsM1, . . . ,Mk are particular instances of these patterns.
So the protocol is represented by clauses R such that there exists  such that terms(R) ⊆
{M1, . . . ,Mk}. Deﬁning S0 = {M1, . . . ,Mk} ∪ SInit, we obtain C1.
For instance, the intended messages for theYahalom protocol are
M1 = (host(Kas),Na)
M2 = (host(Kbs), sencrypt((host(Kas),Na,MNb),Kbs))
M3 = (sencrypt((host(Kbs),MK,Na,MNb),Kas),
sencrypt((host(Kas),MK),Kbs))
M4 = (sencrypt((host(Kas),MK),Kbs), sencrypt(MNb,MK))
M5 = sencrypt(secretA,MK)
withMNb = Nb(host(Kas),Na) andMK = Kab(Kas,Kbs,Na,MNb). It is easy to check
that the clauses (Msg1)–(Msg5) satisfy the condition C1.
Condition C2models that each name function symbol is created at a unique occurrence in
the protocol. (This corresponds essentially to unique origination in the strand spaces model
[17].) Condition C3 means that, in its intended behaviour, the protocol uses public-key
encryption only with public keys.
Deﬁnition 3 (Plain protocol program). A plain protocol program is a protocol program
RAll with associated set of closed terms S0, such that:
C4. The only constructors and destructors are those of Fig. 1, plus host.
C5. The arguments of pk and host in S0 are atomic constants.
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Condition C5 essentially means that the protocol only uses pairs of atomic keys for public
key cryptography, and atomic keys for long-term secret keys. (Note that only keys linked to
one host name by the function hostmust be atomic; when the protocol establishes a shared
key between several hosts, this key does not need to be atomic.)
Tagging a protocol is a simple syntactic annotation of messages. We add a tag to each
application of a primitive sencrypt, pencrypt, sign, nmrsign, hash,mac, such that, in the
intended execution of the protocol, two applications of the same primitive with the same tag
have the same parameters. In the terminology of [21], this is “component number tagging”.
For example, after tagging, theYahalom protocol becomes:
Message 1. A → B : (A,Na)
Message 2. B → S : (B, {c1, A,Na,Nb}Kbs )
Message 3. S → A : ({c2, B,Kab,Na,Nb}Kas , {c3, A,Kab}Kbs )
Message 4. A → B : ({c3, A,Kab}Kbs , {c4, Nb}Kab)
All executions of the protocol reuse the same tags c1, c2, . . . for the same components. If
the original protocol translates to a plain protocol program, its tagged version translates to
a tagged protocol program, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 4 (Tagged protocol program). A tagged protocol program is a plain protocol
programRAll with associated set of closed terms S0 such that:
C6. If f ∈ {sencrypt, pencrypt, sign, nmrsign, hash,mac} occurs in a term in S0 or in
terms(R) for R ∈ RProt, then its ﬁrst argument is the tuple (c,M1, . . . ,Mn) for some
constant c and termsM1, . . . ,Mn.
C7. Every two subterms of terms in S0 of the form f ((c, . . .), . . .) with the same prim-
itive f ∈ {sencrypt, pencrypt, sign, nmrsign, hash,mac} and the same tag c are
identical.
The condition that constant tags appear in terms(R) (Condition C6) means that honest
protocol participants always send tagged terms and check the tags of received messages
(something that the informal description of a tagged protocol leaves implicit). More pre-
cisely, they check the tags of the ciphertexts that they can decrypt and of the signatures that
they can check. They check the tags of hashes and macs by comparison: they check equality
of the received hash or mac with a hash or mac that they build using the expected tag. The
condition also expresses that the initial knowledge of the attacker consists of tagged terms.
To illustrate the effect of tagging, we consider the Needham–Schroeder shared-key proto-
col.The algorithmdoes not terminate on its original version,which is untagged. It terminates
after adding tags. In this protocol, we have two messages of the form:
Message 4. B → A : {NB}K
Message 5. A → B : {NB − 1}K
whereNB is a nonce. Representing this with a functionminusone(x) = x−1, the algorithm
does not terminate.
Indeed, message 5 is represented by a clause of the form:
H ∧ att(sencrypt(n, k)) → att(sencrypt(minusone(n), k))
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Protocol Tagging Time (ms)
Needham-Schroeder shared key [26] original non-termination
tagged 27
Woo-Lam shared key [35] original non-termination
tagged 7
Woo-Lam shared key [37] (incorrect) original 8
(correct) tagged 7
Needham-Schroeder public key [26] original 51
Denning-Sacco [15] original 12
Woo-Lam public key [35] original 6
Yahalom [9] original 21
Otway-Rees [28] original 29
Fig. 2. Tagging and termination of the algorithm for a few protocols
where the hypothesis H describes other messages previously received by A. After some
resolution steps, we obtain a clause of the form
att(sencrypt(n,K)) → att(sencrypt(minusone(n),K)) (Loop)
for some term K. The fact att(sencrypt(minusone(NB),K)) is also derived, so a res-
olution step with (Loop) yields: att(sencrypt(minusone(minusone(NB)),K)). This can
again be resolved with (Loop), so that we ﬁnally have a cycle that derives all facts:
att(sencrypt(minusonen(NB),K)).
When tags are added, the rule (Loop) becomes:
att(sencrypt((c1, n),K))→ att(sencrypt((c2,minusone(n)),K)) (NoLoop)
and the previous loop is removed because c2 does not unify with c1. The fact
att(sencrypt((c2,minusone(NB)),K)) is derived, but this does not yield a loop.
Fig. 2 shows a number of examples of protocols from the literature. The veriﬁer does
not terminate on two protocols, Needham–Schroeder shared key andWoo-Lam shared key,
which are not tagged, and terminates after addition of tags to these protocols. One can also
notice that it terminates on many protocols without tags.We partly explain this observation
in Remark 7 below. For theWoo-Lam shared key protocol of [37], adding tags also corrects
a ﬂaw in the protocol, because this protocol is subject to a type ﬂaw attack.
5. Termination proof
Instead of giving the termination proof in one big step, we ﬁrst consider a special case
(Section 5.1), and then describe the modiﬁcation of the ﬁrst proof that yields the proof for
the general case (Section 5.2).
We write Paramspk for the set of arguments of pk in S0, and Paramshost for the set of
arguments of host in S0. The special case is deﬁned by the condition that Paramspk and
Paramshost each have at most one element.
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This restriction is meaningful in terms of models of protocols: it corresponds to merging
several keys. In the example of theYahalom protocol, thismeans that, in the clauses, the keys
Kas and Kbs should be replaced with a single key, k0 (so the host namesA = host(Kas) and
B = host(Kbs) are replaced with a single name host(k0)).When studying secrecy, merging
all keys of honest hosts in this way helps to model cases in which one host plays several
roles in the protocol. The secrecy for the clauses with merged keys implies secrecy for the
protocol without merged keys. However, this merging is not acceptable for authentication
[5]. This is why we also consider the general case in Section 5.2.
5.1. The special case of one key
We now deﬁne weakly tagged programs by the conditions that we use in the ﬁrst termina-
tion proof. In the special case, these conditions are strictlymore general than tagged protocol
programs. This plays a role to deduce termination for protocols that are not explicitly tagged
(see Remark 7).
A term is said to be non-data when it is not of the form f (. . .) with f in DataConstr. The
set sub(S) contains the subterms of terms in the set S.
The set tagGen contains the non-variable non-data subterms of terms of clauses inRProt
and of terms M1, . . . ,Mn in clauses of the form att(f (M1, . . . ,Mn)) ∧ att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧
att(xm) → att(x) in condense(RCryptoDestr) (this is the form required in W1 below). This
set summarizes the terms that appear in the clauses and that should be tagged.
Deﬁnition 5 (Weakly tagged programs). A programRAll of the formRAll = RPrimitives ∪
RProt (whereRPrimitives is a program for primitives) is weakly tagged if there exists a ﬁnite
set of closed terms S0 such that:
W1. All clauses in the setR′CryptoDestr = condense(RCryptoDestr) are of the form
att(f (M1, . . . ,Mn)) ∧ att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xm) → att(x)
where f ∈ CryptoConstr, x is one of M1, . . . ,Mn, and f (M1, . . . ,Mn) is more
general than every term of the form f (. . .) in sub(S0).
W2. For all clauses R inRProt, there exists a substitution  such that terms(R) ⊆ S0.
W3. If two termsM1 andM2 in tagGen unify, N1 is an instance ofM1 in sub(S0), and N2
is an instance ofM2 in sub(S0), then N1 = N2.
Condition W3 is the key of the termination proof. We are going to show the following
invariant: all terms in the generated clauses are instances of terms in tagGen and have
instances in sub(S0). This condition makes it possible to prove that, when unifying two
terms satisfying the invariant, the result of the uniﬁcation also satisﬁes the invariant; this
is because the instances in sub(S0) of those two terms are in fact equal. Condition W1
guarantees that this continues to hold if only one of the two terms satisﬁes the invariant and
the other stems from a clause inR′CryptoDestr.
Proposition 6. A tagged protocol program where Paramshost and Paramspk each have at
most one element, is weakly tagged.
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Proof. For condition W1, the clauses for sdecrypt, pdecrypt, and getmessage are:
att(sencrypt(x, y)) ∧ att(y) → att(x) (sdecrypt)
att(pencrypt(x, pk(y))) ∧ att(y) → att(x) (pdecrypt)
att(sign(x, y)) → att(x) (getmessage)
and they satisfy conditionW1 provided that all public-key encryptions in S0 are of the form
pencrypt(M1, pk(M2)) (that is C3). In the clause (pdecrypt), the constructor pk maps the
secret key y to the corresponding public key pk(y). The clauses for checksignature and
nmrchecksign are
att(sign(x, y)) ∧ att(pk(y)) → att(x) (checksignature)
att(nmrsign(x, y)) ∧ att(pk(y)) ∧ att(x) → att(true) (nmrchecksign)
These two clauses are subsumed, respectively, by the clauses for getmessage (given above)
and true (which is simply att(true) since true is a zero-ary constructor), so they are elimi-
nated by condense, i.e., they are not inR′CryptoDestr. (This is important, because they do not
satisfy condition W1.)
Condition W2 is identical to condition C1. We now prove condition W3. Let
S1 = {f ((ci , x1, . . . , xn), x′2, . . . , x′n′) |
f ∈ {sencrypt, pencrypt, sign, nmrsign, hash,mac}}
∪{a(x1, . . . , xn) | a name function symbol}
∪{pk(x), host(x)} ∪ {c | c atomic constant}
By condition C4, the only term in tagGen that comes from clauses ofR′CryptoDestr is pk(x).
Using condition C6, all terms in tagGen are instances of terms in S1 (noticing that tagGen
does not contain variables). Using conditions C2, C5, C7, and the fact that Paramspk and
Paramshost have at most one element, each term in S1 has at most one instance in sub(S0).
IfM1 andM2 in tagGen unify, they are both instances of the same elementM ′ in S1 (since
different elements of S1 do not unify with each other). Let N1 and N2 be any instances of
M1 andM2 (respectively) in sub(S0). Then N1 and N2 are instances ofM ′ ∈ S1 in sub(S0)
so N1 = N2. Thus we obtain W3. 
Remark 7. Some protocols are in fact weakly tagged without explicitly adding constant
tags. For instance, this is true for the Woo and Lam public key protocol (after merging the
keys skA and skS):
Message 1. A → B : A
Message 2. B → A : N
Message 3. A → B : {A,B,N}skA
Message 4. B → S : A
Message 5. S → B : A, {A,pkA}skS
Indeed, since different encryptions in the protocol have a different arity, we can take
pencrypt((x1, . . . , xn), x′) in S1 in the proof above, and use the same reasoning as above
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to prove the condition W3. This shows both that the original protocol is protected against
type ﬂaw attacks, and that the algorithm also terminates on the original protocol. We can
say that the protocol is “implicitly tagged”: the arity replaces the tag. This situation happens
in some other examples: In Fig. 2, this is also the case of the Denning–Sacco protocol. This
can partly explain why the algorithm often terminates even for protocols without explicit
tags.
A term is top-tagged when it is an instance of a term in tagGen. Intuitively, referring to
the case of explicit constant tags, top-tagged terms are terms whose top function symbol is
tagged. A term is fully tagged when all its non-variable non-data subterms are top-tagged.
We next show the invariant that all terms in the generated clauses are non-data, fully
tagged, and have instances in sub(S0). Using this invariant, we show that the size of an
instance in sub(S0) of a clause obtained by resolution from R andR′ is smaller than the size
of an instance of R or R′ in sub(S0). This implies the termination of the algorithm.
Let us deﬁne the size of a term M, size(M), as usual, and the size of a clause by
size(att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) → att(M)) = size(M1) + · · · + size(Mn) + size(M). The
hypotheses of clauses form a multiset, so when we compute size(R) and the substitution 
maps several hypotheses to the same fact, this fact is counted several times in size. Intuitively,
the size of clauses can increase during resolution, because the uniﬁcation can instantiate
terms. However, the size of their corresponding closed instance in sub(S0) decreases.
Proposition 8. Assuming aweakly tagged program (Deﬁnition 5) andR0 = RCryptoConstr∪
RCryptoDestr ∪RProt, the computation of saturate(R0) terminates.
Proof.We show by induction that all rules R generated fromR0 either are inRCryptoConstr∪
R′CryptoDestr, or are such that the terms of R are non-data, fully tagged, and mapped to
sub(S0) by a substitution , i.e., terms(R) ⊆ sub(S0).
First, we can easily show that all rules in condense(R0) satisfy this property.
If we combine by resolution two rules inRCryptoConstr ∪R′CryptoDestr, we in fact combine
one rule of RCryptoConstr with one rule of RCryptoDestr. The resulting rule is a tautology by
condition W1, so it is eliminated immediately.
Otherwise, we combine by resolution a rule R such that the terms of R are non-data and
fully tagged, and there exists a substitution  such that terms(R) ⊆ sub(S0), with a rule
R′ such that one of 1, 2, or 3 holds.
(1) The terms of R′ are non-data and fully tagged, there exists a substitution ′ such that
terms(′R′) ⊆ sub(S0), and sel(R′) = ∅ (in which case sel(R) = ∅).
(2) R′ ∈ RCryptoConstr.
(3) R′ ∈ R′CryptoDestr.
Let R′′ be the rule obtained by resolution of R and R′. We show that the terms of R′′
are fully tagged, and there exists a substitution ′′ such that terms(′′R′′) ⊆ sub(S0) and
size(′′R′′) < size(R).
LetM0, . . . ,Mn be the terms of R, att(M0) being the atom of R on which we resolve. In
all cases, the terms of R′ areM ′, x1, . . . , xn′ , the variables x1, . . . , xn′ occur inM ′ and are
pairwise distinct variables, and att(M ′) is the atom of R′ on which we resolve. (In case 1,
because sel(R′) = ∅ and by the optimizations elimattx and elimdup; in case 2, by deﬁnition
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of constructor rules; in case 3, by W1.) The terms M0 and M ′ unify, let u be their most
general uniﬁer. Then the terms ofR′′ are ux1, . . . ,uxn′ ,uM1, . . . ,uMn. By the choice
of the selection function, the termsM0 andM ′ are not variables.
We know that M0, …, Mn are in sub(S0). We show that there exists ′ such that
M0 = ′M ′.
• In case 1, there exists ′ such that ′M ′ ∈ sub(S0). The terms M0 and M ′ are non-data
fully tagged, so all their non-variable non-data subterms are top-tagged. In particular,
since they are not variables,M0 andM ′ themselves are top-tagged, i.e.,M0 is an instance
of some N0 ∈ tagGen and M ′ is an instance of some N ′0 ∈ tagGen. Since M0 and M ′
unify, so do N0 and N ′0, ′M ′ is an instance of N ′0 in sub(S0), M0 is an instance of N0
in sub(S0), so by condition W3, ′M ′ = M0.
• In case 2, M ′ is of the form f (x1, . . . , xn′). Since M0 is not a variable and uniﬁes with
M ′,M0 has root symbol f, so M0 is an instance ofM ′.
• In case 3, by condition 5, M ′ is more general than every term in sub(S0) with the same
root symbol, hence the instance M0 of the term M0 that is uniﬁable with M ′ and thus
has the same root symbol.
The substitution equal to  on the variables of R and to ′ on the variables of R′ is
then a uniﬁer ofM0 andM ′. Since u is the most general uniﬁer, there exists ′′ such that
′′u is equal to  on the variables of R, and to ′ on the variables of R′. Thus the terms
of ′′R′′ are ′x1, . . . ,′xn′ ,M1, . . . ,Mn. The terms ′x1, . . . ,′xn′ are subterms of
′M ′ = M0 which is in sub(S0), so they are also in sub(S0). So all terms of ′′R′′ are
in sub(S0).
Moreover, size(′′R′′) < size(R). Indeed, x1, . . . , xn′ occur in M ′ and are different
variables. So ′x1, . . . ,′xn′ are disjoint subterms of ′M ′, andM ′ does not consist of only
a variable, so size(′x1)+ · · · + size(′xn′) < size(′M ′) = size(M0), and size(′′R′′) <
size(M0)+ · · · + size(Mn) = size(R).
We show that the terms of R′′ are fully tagged.
• In case 1, since u is the most general uniﬁer of fully tagged terms, we can show that,
for all x, ux is fully tagged, so for all fully tagged terms M, we can show that uM is
fully tagged, so the terms of R′′ are fully tagged.
• In case 2, for x among x1, . . . , xn′ , ux is a subterm ofM0, so is fully tagged. The terms
uM1, . . . ,uMn are equal toM1, . . . ,Mn, also fully tagged.
• In case 3,M ′ = f (M ′1, . . . ,M ′m) andM0 = f (M ′′1 , . . . ,M ′′m), so u is also themost gen-
eral uniﬁer of the pairs (M ′1,M ′′1 ), …, (M ′m,M ′′m) of fully tagged terms. So we conclude
as in case 1.
Finally, the terms of R′′ are fully tagged, terms(′′R′′) ⊆ sub(S0), and size(′′R′′) <
size(R).
Then it is easy to show that all rules Rs ∈ simplify(R′′) obtained after simpliﬁcation of
R′′ have non-data fully tagged terms and satisfy terms(′′Rs) ⊆ sub(S0), and size(′′Rs) <
size(R). Indeed, all rules in decomp(R′′) satisfy this property. (The decomposition of data
constructors transforms fully tagged terms into non-data fully tagged terms.) This property
is preserved by elimdup and elimattx.
Therefore, for all generated rules R, there exists  such that size(R) is smaller than the
maximum initial value of size(R) for a rule of the protocol. There is a ﬁnite number of
such rules (since size(R)size(R)). So the algorithm terminates. 
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The termination of the backward depth-ﬁrst search for closed facts is easy to show, for
example by a proof similar to that of [4]. Essentially, the size of the goal decreases, because
the size of the hypotheses of each clause is smaller than the size of the conclusion. (Recall
that all terms of hypotheses of clauses of saturate(R0)∪RDataConstr are variables that occur
in the conclusion.) So we obtain:
Theorem 9. The resolution-based veriﬁcation algorithm terminates for weakly tagged
programs and closed facts.
As a corollary, by Proposition 6, we obtain the same result for tagged protocol programs,
when Paramshost and Paramspk have at most one element.
5.2. Handling several keys
The extension to several arguments of pk or of host requires an additional step. We
deﬁne a homomorphism h from terms to terms that replaces all elements of Paramspk and
of Paramshost with a special constant k0. We extend h to facts, clauses, and sets of clauses
naturally. For the protocol program h(RProt), Paramspk and Paramshost each have at most
one element. So by Proposition 6, when RProt is a tagged protocol program, h(RProt) is a
weakly tagged program.
LetRProt be any program such that h(RProt) is a weakly tagged program.We consider a
“less optimized algorithm” in which elimination of duplicate hypotheses and of tautologies
are performed only for facts of the form att(x) and elimination of subsumed clauses is
performed only for the condensing of rules ofRCryptoDestr.We observe that Theorem 9 holds
also for the less optimized algorithm, with the same proof, so this algorithm terminates on
h(RProt). All resolution steps possible for the less optimized algorithm applied to RProt
are possible for the less optimized algorithm applied to h(RProt) as well (more terms are
uniﬁable, and the remaining optimizations of the less optimized algorithm commute with
the application of h). Then the less optimized algorithm terminates onRProt. We can show
that then the original, fully optimized algorithm also terminates.
In particular, the algorithm terminates for all tagged protocol programs and for implicitly
taggedprotocols, such as theWooandLampublic key andDenning–Saccoprotocolswithout
tags by Remark 7.
Theorem 10. The resolution-based veriﬁcation algorithm terminates for tagged protocol
programs and closed facts.
We recall that a tagged protocol program may be obtained by translating a protocol after
tagging, and that the algorithm checks the non-derivability of the closed fact att(M), which
shows the secrecy of the message M.
6. Complexity
We will next show that the algorithm performs in exponential time in the size of the
input protocol.We need to deﬁne what we mean by the size of the input protocol. Formally,
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the input of the algorithm is not the informal description of a protocol; instead, it is its
translation in the form of a set of Horn clauses. The set of Horn clauses by itself, however,
is not sufﬁcient to deﬁne the input size. Remember that the terms in the Horn clauses
represent only a partial information about the messages being sent (the information that
the participants have). The full information about the set of ‘intended’ messages, which is
present in the informal description of the input protocol, is formalized in a protocol program.
A protocol program (see Deﬁnition 2) consists of a set of Horn clauses RAll together with
the set S0 of closed terms formalizing the intended messages. The set RAll consists of the
set RProt of protocol clauses translating the protocol and the set RPrimitives, the program
for primitives, which is ﬁxed by the signature of the protocol. Therefore, we deﬁne that the
parameter for the input size is the size ofRProt and S0 (the size of a set of clauses and terms
is the total size of all their terms).
The cost analysis of our algorithm does not change if we exchange its input parameter
against one that is polynomially smaller or larger. Below we deﬁne the parameter n for the
input size; n is the maximal size of a possible instance R of a protocol clause R such that
the terms in R are subterms of S0.
n = max{size(R) | R ∈ RProt, terms(R) ⊆ sub(S0)} (1)
The size ofRProt and S0 is at most quadratic in that number.
The parameter n is smaller than the size of the messages in the informal description of
the protocol and in the initial knowledge of the attacker, after replacing each name by the
corresponding term that we introduce by skolemization.
Theorem 11. If a protocol is translated to a protocol program with the set RProt of pro-
tocol clauses in R0 and the set S0 of intended messages, the resolution-based veriﬁcation
algorithm is exponential in the size ofRProt and S0.
Equivalently, the algorithm is exponential in the input parameter n deﬁned in (1).
Proof.We deﬁne the set R of all clauses R derived from the set RProt of protocol clauses
(and the other clauses inR0, which are part ofRPrimitives, the program for primitives, ﬁxed
by the signature of the protocol). By the proof of Proposition 8 (see the last paragraph of
the proof), the size of each such clause R is smaller than the size of a possible instance R′
of a protocol clause R′ such that the terms in R′ are subterms of S0.
R ⊆ {R | size(R)n}.
Given n, there are exponentially many clauses R whose size is smaller than n. Thus, the
number of clauses inR is exponential; so the cost of the algorithm is also exponential. 
Exponential example: To show that our cost estimation for the algorithm is not too conser-
vative, we give an example of a tagged protocol program on which the algorithm is indeed
exponential.
att(ci ), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
att(k0)
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att(x) ∧ att(y) → att(sencrypt(x, y)) (sencrypt)
att(x) → att(sencrypt((ci , a(x)), k0)), i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (Msg i)
att(sencrypt((c1, x1), k0)) ∧ · · · ∧ att(sencrypt((cn, xn), k0))
→ att(b(x1, . . . , xn)) (Last msg)
This example contains 2n + 3 rules, and is of size O(n). The selection is empty for the
ﬁrst four rules. It is not empty for the last rule. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the ﬁrst hypothesis is selected in the last rule. Then, the last rule can resolve with the rules
(sencrypt) and (Msg i). If it resolves with (sencrypt), we obtain
att(c1) ∧ att(x1) ∧ att(k0) ∧ att(sencrypt((c2, x2), k0))
∧ · · · ∧ att(sencrypt((cn, xn), k0)) → att(b(x1, x2, . . . , xn))
Depending on the selection, the hypotheses att(c1) and att(k0)might be removed by resolv-
ing with one of the ﬁrst two rules. In all cases, a fact att(sencrypt((ci , xi), k0)) ﬁnally gets
selected, and we come back to the situation of rule (Last msg) with one hypothesis less.
If it resolves with (Msg i), we obtain
att(x′1) ∧ att(sencrypt((c2, x2), k0))∧ · · · ∧ att(sencrypt((cn, xn), k0)) → att(b(a(x′1), x2, . . . , xn)).
A fact att(sencrypt((ci , xi), k0)) gets selected, and we also come back to the situation of
rule (Last msg) with one hypothesis less (and with a(x′1) instead of x1 in the conclusion).
In the end, we obtain 2n rules, of the form
H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn → att(b(M1, . . . ,Mn)),
where for each i in 1, . . . , n, either Hi = att(x′i ) and Mi = a(x′i ), or Hi = att(xi) (and
perhaps att(ci ) and/or att(k0)) andMi = xi . (Intuitively, these 2n rules must be generated
because no other rules can be used to derive the 2n facts att(b(M1, . . . ,Mn)) whereMi is
either a(k0) or k0. )
The algorithm is quite efﬁcient in our examples. It would be interesting to know whether
there exists a natural class of ‘realistic’ protocol programs for which the algorithm is poly-
nomial.
7. Extension to authentication
In [5], the Horn clause veriﬁcation technique has been extended to verify authentication
properties of protocols, speciﬁed by correspondence assertions [36]. For simplicity, we
focus here on the case of non-injective agreement [24]: The protocol can execute events
begin(M) and end(M), and one wants to show that if the protocol executes end(M), then
it must have executed begin(M) for the same value of M.
The proof technique for authentication involves two extensions to the Horn clause model:
• Fresh names are functions not only of the messages previously received but also of
a session identiﬁer: an argument that takes a different value for each execution of a
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participant of the protocol. This makes it possible to distinguish different names created
after receiving the same messages.
• New predicates are added. A fact begin(M) means that the event begin(M) has been
executed, while a fact end(M) means that the event end(M) may have been executed.
When a participant of the protocol executes an end(M) event after receiving messages
M1, . . . ,Mn,RProt contains the clause
att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) → end(M).
When a participant of the protocol outputs a messageM after receivingM1, . . . ,Mn and
executing the event begin(M ′),RProt contains the clause
att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) ∧ begin(M ′) → att(M).
As in the case of secrecy, when a participant of the protocol outputs a message M after
receivingM1, . . . ,Mn (without executing a begin event),RProt contains the clause
att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) → att(M).
The facts begin(M) can appear only in the hypothesis of clauses, and the selection
function never selects them. The facts end(M) can appear only in the conclusion of
clauses.
We use a result detailed in [5]. Assume that, for all closed terms M, if the fact end(M) is
derivable from the clauses then a fact begin(M)must be present in the hypotheses. Then, for
all closed termsM, if the protocol executes end(M), then it must have executed begin(M),
so the protocol satisﬁes non-injective agreement. More formally:
Theorem 12. Assume that, for any Rb set of closed begin facts, if end(M) is derivable
fromRAll∪Rb, then begin(M) ∈ Rb. Then the protocol satisﬁes non-injective agreement.
To apply this result, we modify the selection function such that it never selects begin
facts:
sel(H → C) =


∅ if all elements of H are of the form att(x) or begin(M),
{F } where F = att(x), F = begin(M), and F ∈ H,
otherwise.
The protocol veriﬁer checks that all clauses in saturate(R0) whose conclusion is end(M ′)
for someM ′ contain begin(M ′) in their hypothesis. As mentioned in [5], this implies that,
if end(M) is derivable from RAll ∪ Rb, then begin(M) ∈ Rb, so by Theorem 12, the
protocol satisﬁes non-injective agreement.
We can extend our termination result for tagged protocols to authentication proofs. We
add the following condition to the deﬁnition of protocol programs and of weakly tagged
programs:
C1′. For all clauses R in RProt, all variables that occur in the conclusion of R also occur
in att facts in its hypothesis, except session identiﬁers. Session identiﬁers occur only
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at speciﬁc positions as arguments of names function symbols a(. . .), and only session
identiﬁers occur at those positions.
This condition is true for all protocols when Horn clauses are built as explained in [5]. We
also add the following optimization to simplify:
• Elimination of useless begin facts: elimbegin eliminates begin facts in which a variable
x occurs, and x only occurs in begin facts and in att(x) hypotheses.
This optimization is always sound, because it creates a stronger clause. It does not lead
to a loss of precision in the case of authentication. Indeed, assume that begin(M) con-
tains a variable which does not occur in the conclusion. This is preserved by resolution,
so when we obtain a clause begin(M ′) ∧ H → end(M ′′), where begin(M ′) comes
from begin(M), M ′ cannot be equal to M ′′, so this occurrence of begin(M ′) cannot
be used to prove authentication. However, in the more general case when we want to
know which begin events must be executed to reach a given end event, this optimiza-
tion leads to a loss of precision (it may miss some begin events). That is why this
optimization was present in early implementations which veriﬁed only authentication,
and was later abandoned. We could consider reintroducing it when testing authentica-
tion, if we had termination problems on practical examples, which was not the case up
to now.
Note that, after this optimization, the fact att(x) will also be eliminated by elimattx.
Thanks to this optimization, in a clause R such that sel(R) = ∅, all variables that occur
in the hypothesis also occur in the conclusion. Indeed, if a variable occurs only in the
hypothesis, either it occurs in a begin fact, and this fact is eliminated by elimbegin, or it
occurs only in att(x), and this fact is eliminated by elimattx.
Theorem 13. The resolution-based veriﬁcation algorithm that proves authentication ter-
minates for weakly tagged programs and for tagged protocol programs.
Proof. As explained at the end of Section 3, the conclusion of a rule R is not of the form
att(x) when sel(R) = ∅. The presence of begin facts complicates the proof of this point.
This is why Condition C1′ is useful. We can show that Condition C1′ is in fact true for all
clauses generated by the algorithm (it is preserved by resolution).
Using this property, if sel(R) = ∅, then the conclusion of R is not att(x). Indeed, if the
conclusion of Rwas att(x), x is not a session identiﬁer, since it is not an argument of a name
function symbol, so x would occur in the att facts in the hypothesis of R. Since sel(R) = ∅,
all these hypotheses are att(xi) for some variables xi , then one of the hypotheses would be
att(x), so R would be a tautology, so it would have been removed by elimtaut. This proves
the result.
So we still have the property that facts att(x) are never uniﬁed during the resolution.
The proof of Prop. 8 then needs only minor changes. In case 1, the terms of R′ are
M ′, x1, . . . , xn′ ,M ′1, . . . ,M ′m, where we resolve on att(M ′) andR′ has hypotheses att(x1),
. . . , att(xn′), begin(M ′1), . . . , begin(M ′m). Thanks to the optimization elimbegin,
x1, . . . , xn′ occur inM ′. By hypothesis, there exists a substitution ′ such that ′M ′,′x1,
. . . ,′xn′ , ′M ′1, . . . ,′M ′m are in sub(S0).As in the proof of Prop. 8, we build ′′, such that
the terms of ′′R′′ are ′x1, . . . ,′xn′ ,′M ′1, . . . ,′M ′m,M1, . . . ,Mn. By deﬁnition of
 and ′, these terms are in sub(S0).
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We do not count begin facts in the deﬁnition of the size of a clause. (Otherwise, we
could have size(′′R′′)size(R) because of begin facts coming from R′.) We show that
size(′′R′′) < size(R) and that the terms of R′′ are fully tagged as in Property 8. To prove
termination, we have to show that there is a ﬁnite number of rules with size(R) smaller than a
given constant. The size of att facts is bounded by this constant, and the number of variables
in begin facts is also bounded by this constant thanks to the optimization elimbegin. Then
the size of begin facts is also bounded, since they must be more general than terms in
sub(S0). This proves termination.
In the case of authentication, no depth-ﬁrst search is performed, soProperty 8 immediately
implies termination for weakly tagged programs. We handle the case of tagged protocol
programs with several keys as in the proof of Theorem 10. 
When the optimization elimbegin is turned off, we can ﬁnd examples of tagged protocols
on which our algorithm for authentication does not terminate. For example, consider the
clause:
begin(h((c1, x, y))) ∧ att(sencrypt((c, x), k)) ∧ att(y)
→ att(sencrypt((c, y), k)). (2)
The selected hypothesis is att(sencrypt((c, x), k)). By the resolution with the constructor
clauses and with att(k), att(c), we can obtain
begin(h((c1, x, y))) ∧ att(x) ∧ att(y) → att(sencrypt((c, y), k)).
This clause has no selected hypothesis and resolves with (2), and the result of this resolution
again resolves with (2), so we obtain an inﬁnite sequence of clauses:
begin(h((c1, x1, x2))) ∧ · · · ∧ begin(h((c1, xn−1, xn)))
∧att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xn) → att(sencrypt((c, xn), k)).
This example then does not terminate. Note that the clause (2) is not very natural since it
creates a term sencrypt((c, y), k) from a term sencrypt((c, x), k) with the same tag c. One
would rather expect the participant to use a new tag when creating a new term. However,
this clause can belong to a tagged protocol program. Indeed, we choose S0 containing
h((c1, k′, k′)) and sencrypt((c, k′), k) for some constant k′, and x and y are instantiated to
the same value k′ by the substitution that maps terms of clauses to sub(S0). The clause (2)
can also be inferred during the resolution algorithm frommore natural clauses coming from
tagged protocols, although such a situation did not occur during our experiments.
8. Related work
Although several deﬁnitions exist, it has been shown for a reasonable deﬁnition of pro-
tocols, that the veriﬁcation problem of cryptographic protocols is undecidable [16], so one
either restricts the problem, or approximates it.
Decision procedures have been published for restricted cases. In the case of a bounded
number of sessions, for protocols using public-key cryptography with atomic keys and
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shared-key cryptography, protocol insecurity is NP-complete [33], and decisions proce-
dures appear in [13,25,33].When messages are bounded and no nonces are created, secrecy
is DEXPTIME-complete [16]. Strong syntactic restrictions on protocols also yield decid-
ability: [11] for an extension of ping-pong protocols, [3] with a bound on the number of
parallel sessions, and restricted matching on incoming messages (in particular, this match-
ing should be linear and independent of previous messages). Model-checking also provides
a decision technique for a bounded number of sessions [23] (with additional conditions). It
has been extended, with approximations, to an unbounded number of sessions using data in-
dependence techniques [7,8,32], for sequential runs, or when the agents are “factorizable”.
(Essentially, a single run of the agent has to be split into several runs, such that each run
contains only one fresh value.)
On the other hand, some analyses terminate for all protocols, but at the cost of approxi-
mations. For instance, control-ﬂow analysis [27] runs in cubic time, but does not preserve
relations between components of messages, hence introduces an important approximation.
Interestingly, the proof that control ﬂow analysis runs in cubic time also relies on the study
of a particular class of Horn clauses. Techniques using tree automata [19] and rank func-
tions [22] also provide a terminating but approximate analysis. For instance, a rank function
does not distinguish between a case where either of two messages could be sent out, and
a case where both messages can be sent out. Moreover, the computation algorithm of rank
functions assumes atomic keys.
It has been shown in [21] that tagging prevents type ﬂaw attacks. It may be possible to
infer from [21] that the depth of closed terms can be bounded in the search for an attack.
This yields the decidability by exhaustive search, but does not imply the termination of our
algorithm (in particular, because clauses can have an unbounded number of hypotheses,
so there is an inﬁnite number of clauses with a bounded term depth). Ref. [20] shows that
two protocols are independent when messages of different protocols cannot be mixed (i.e.
uniﬁed). Tagging relies on the same idea: it prevents mixing a message with another, here
in the same protocol, and this is the key of our termination proof.
Ramanujam and Suresh [30,31] show that secrecy is decidable for tagged protocols. Their
result differs from ours for two reasons. Their tagging scheme is more restrictive, since it
does not allow blind copies. A blind copy happens when a participant sends back part of
a message he received without looking at what is contained inside this part. On the other
hand, they obtain a decidability result, while we obtain a termination result for an algorithm
which is sound, efﬁcient in practice, but approximate.
As for the approach based on Horn clauses, Weidenbach [34] already gave conditions
under which his algorithm terminates. These conditions may give some idea of why the
algorithm terminates on protocols. They do not seem to apply to many examples of cryp-
tographic protocols. Comon-Lundh and Cortier [12] show that an algorithm using ordered
binary resolution, ordered factorization and splitting terminates on protocols which blindly
copy at most one term in each message. In contrast, our result puts no limit on the number
of blind copies, but requires tagging.
Other techniques such as theorem proving [29] in general require human intervention,
even if some cases can be proved automatically [10,14]. In general, typing [1,18] requires
human intervention in the form of type annotations, that can be automatically checked. The
idea of tagging already appears in [18] in a different context (tagged union types).
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9. Conclusion
Wehave given the theory behind an experimental observation: tagging a protocol enforces
the termination of the resolution-based veriﬁcation technique used. Ourwork has an obvious
consequence to protocol design, namely when one agrees that a design choice in view of a
posteriori veriﬁcation is desirable.
Our termination result for weakly tagged protocols explains only in part another exper-
imental observation, namely the termination for protocols without explicit tags. Although
many of those are weakly tagged, some of them are not (for instance, the Needham–
Schroeder public key protocol). The existence of a termination condition that applies also
to those cases is open.
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